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THE DEATH PENALTY IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPEEVEN THE RAPE OF A CHILD

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1995, Louisiana amended its criminal code to allow for
the sentence of death to be imposed when a person is
convicted of raping a child under the age of twelve.' In 1996,
Georgia followed suit and amended its penal code to become
the second and only other state to impose such a severe
penalty for the crime of rape.2
Soon after Louisiana revised its penal code, the Louisiana
grand jury indicted the first two defendants charged under
this new law.3 Anthony Wilson was charged with the rape of
a five-year-old girl.4 Patrick Bethley was charged with raping
three girls, ages five, seven, and nine.5 One of the victims
was Bethley's daughter.' Furthermore, at the time of his
alleged crimes, Bethley knew he was HIV positive.7 Both
defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of the new Louisiana
statute.8 They relied primarily on a 1977 United States
Supreme Court case, which held that capital punishment was
cruel and unusual punishment for the rape of an adult
woman.' In June 1997, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari to Wilson's and Bethley's cases as neither
defendant had been convicted, but reserved its right to review
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997).
2. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-1 (1997).
3. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2425 (1997).
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1065.

8. Id.
9. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
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a decision if a conviction should issue."°
At a time when politicians are basing their political
campaigns on law and order platforms, including proposals
that the death penalty be instituted for rape and child
molestation," we as a society, and in particular the courts,
are being faced with the question of whether death should be
imposed on a citizen convicted of raping a child.
This comment outlines the United States Supreme
Court's historic treatment of the imposition of the death
penalty in rape cases'2 and concludes that such a severe
punishment is cruel and unusual for the rape of anyone."
First, it will detail the United States Supreme Court's rulings
in Furman v. Georgia,'4 where most of the states' death
penalty legislation was invalidated, 5 and Gregg v. Georgia,6
where the Court held that the death penalty was not
invariably cruel and unusual.'7 Next, this comment examines
Coker v. Georgia,8 in which the Court held that the death
penalty was a "grossly" disproportionate punishment for the
crime of raping an adult woman. 9 Then this comment
discusses how lawmakers throughout the nation reacted to
the Coker decision, including the repeal of all legislation
allowing the death penalty to be imposed as punishment for
the crime of rape.20
Lastly, this comment analyzes
Louisiana's 1995 statute instituting the death penalty for the
rape of a child.' After comparing the rationale behind the
Coker decision and Louisiana's new law," this comment
concludes that the age of the victim does not change the crime
10. Id. "The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review that decision, at least
for now. Three Justices-John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer-wrote to point out that the Court could hear the case later if
one of the men is in fact sentenced to death." Michael Higgins, Is Capital
Punishment for Killers Only?, 83 A.B.A. J. 30 (1997).
11. See Al Checchi, Al Checchi for Governor-Checchi Issues (last modified
Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.alchecchi.com/pages/issues.html>.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A-E.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. See discussion infra Part II.D.
18. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
19. See discussion infra Part II.E.
20. See discussion infra Part II.F.
21. See discussion infra Part II.G.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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and that the sentence of death is too severe a punishment for
the crime
of rape or any crime that does not include intent to
23
kill.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The HistoricalPerspective
The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." 24 Despite the extreme nature of the death penalty,
even the framers accepted it as appropriate in some
circumstances. 25 During the debates of the first Congress on
the Bill of Rights, it was noted that though no cruel and
unusual punishment was to be inflicted, "it was sometimes
necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping and
perhaps having their ears cut off.2 6 In the early days, states
punished many felonies with death; but over time the
definition of cruel and unusual punishment broadened 2' and
crimes where the death penalty was an acceptable form of
punishment decreased.28
In the twentieth century, many American states continue
to have the death penalty on their books, 9 but the class of
murders to be punished by death has narrowed" and
subsequently there has been widespread adoption of laws
expressly granting juries the discretion to recommend
mercy."' There has been a steady decline in the infliction of
the death penalty in every decade since
1930, the earliest
2
period for which statistics are available.
Currently, there is no one on death row for a crime that
23. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

25. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1976).
26. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972). The concern, even at the
time of the drafting of the Eighth Amendment, was that punishments be
administered fairly and not selectively to "minorities... out casts of
society... who are unpopular." Id. at 243.
27. See Higgins, supra note 10.
28. Id.
29. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 289 (1976)).
30. Id.
31. Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976).
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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did not involve a killing,33 and no one has been executed for
rape in the United States since 1964. 34 Before the United
States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia35 in 1972,
sixteen states allowed for the death penalty to be imposed as
a punishment for the crime of rape. 6 The ruling in Furman
invalidated the majority of the states' death penalty laws.37
After Furman, only three states reenacted the death penalty
for the crime of rape. 31
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court declared that
it was unconstitutional to sentence a man to die for raping an
adult woman. 9 Since that time, two states '° have attempted
to get around the Supreme Court's ruling by amending their
laws to allow for the death penalty to be imposed on someone
convicted of raping a child.4 '
B. Furman v. Georgia: Death Penalty Reform
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
Furman v. Georgia,42 in which the Supreme Court of Georgia
and the Court of Appeals in Texas had confirmed the
convictions and sentences of death for one murderer and two
rapists.3 All three defendants were black.
Both men
convicted of rape had raped white women; ' one used a pair of
scissors as his weapon and the other had no weapon.41

33. See Higgins, supra note 10, at 31.
34. See id. at 30.
35. 403 U.S. 238 (1972).
36. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
37. See id. at 594.
38. See id. North Carolina, Georgia and Louisiana reenacted the death
penalty for the crime of rape. Id.
39. See id. at 584.
40. See discussion supra Part I. Georgia and Louisiana revised their laws to
provide for the death penalty as punishment for the crime of raping a child
under twelve.

See also GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-1 (1997); LA. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997).
41. GA. CODE. ANN.

§

16-6-1 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West

1997).
42. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
44. Id. at 253.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 253 (1972). This comment will not analyze the great disparity in
the treatment of minorities and the poor when it comes to the death penalty.
For further analysis, see Furman. See also Carol Steiker, Remembering Race,
Rape and CapitalPunishment, 83 VA. L. REV. 693 (1997).
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Neither of the rape victims were killed.47
In its opinion, the United States Supreme Court
expressed great concern for the manner in which the death
penalty was handed out.4 8 Juries had broad discretion when
deciding if a defendant should die or be imprisoned and there
were no standards governing the selection of the penalty.4 9 A
statistical analysis conducted by the NAACP revealed that in
the forty years surveyed, every single one of the forty-five
men executed for rape was black." Although white men had
also been convicted of the same crime, they were not
sentenced to die. 51
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court held that
death penalty laws could no longer allow for arbitrary
sentences.52 The Court was explicit, noting that the Eighth
Amendment requires legislatures to write penal laws that are
"even handed, non-selective, and non-arbitrary."" In order to
be constitutional, the death penalty laws had to provide
procedural safeguards to assure that people were treated
equally.5 4 One way to ensure that a punishment was not
cruel and unusual was to make sure not only that it fit the
crime, but that everyone found guilty for committing that
crime was punished the same way.55 The concerns expressed
in Furman, that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner,56 could only be met through
carefully drafted statutes, which ensured that the sentencing
authority was given adequate information and guidance.5"

47. Furman,408 U.S. at 252-53.
48. Id. Minority groups were often sentenced to die at a greater rate than
other segments of the population. Id. at 249-51.
49. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972).
50. See Steiker, supra note 46, at 699. In fact, research shows that the
proportion of blacks executed in the United States after 1930 for rape, 89%, was
greater than that for murder, 55%.

DAVID LESTER, THE DEATH PENALTY-

IsSUEs AND ANSWERS, 32 (1987).
51. See Steiker, supra note 50, at 699.
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194 (1972).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 195. Specifically, the sentencing authority should be required to
specify the factors it relied upon in making its decision. This will provide "the
further safeguard of meaningful appellate review" to ensure that death
sentences are imposed fairly. Id.
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C. Reaction to Furman by the States
The Court's ruling in Furman invalidated most of the
states' capital punishment statutes because of the manner in
which the death penalty was imposed under those laws.58
Before Furman was decided, only sixteen states and the
federal government authorized the death penalty for rape."
After Furman was decided, of the thirty-five states that
reinstated the death penalty," only Georgia, North Carolina,
and Louisiana included the rape of an adult woman as a
capital offense in their revised legislation."
Though North Carolina and Louisiana revised their laws
relating to the death penalty,62 both of these laws were
invalidated in 1976.63

In Woodson v. North Carolina," the

United States Supreme Court held that North Carolina's law,
which provided for mandatory death sentences, "failed to curb
arbitrary and wanton jury discretion "" and was
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.66 That same year in Roberts v. Louisiana,7 the
Court reiterated its position, holding that Louisiana's
mandatory death sentence "also fail[ed] to comply with
Furman's requirement that standardless jury discretion be
replaced by... safeguard[s] against the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty."' When North
Carolina and Louisiana again revised their laws they
reenacted the death penalty for the crime of murder but did
not include rape as a capital offense.69
When Georgia amended its death penalty legislation
after Furman, it retained the death penalty for murder,
kidnapping for ransom where the victim is harmed, armed
58. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
59. See id. at 594.
60. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1068 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
61. Id. North Carolina and Louisiana's laws were invalidated because they
imposed mandatory death sentences. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. Coker later
invalidated Georgia's law. Id. at 584.
62. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
63. Id. at 595.
64. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
65. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
66. Id.
67. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
68. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976).
69. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977).

19991

THE DEATH PENALTY

1273

The
robbery, treason, aircraft hijacking, and rape. 0
constitutionality of Georgia's law was tested in 1976, but only
with regard to the crime of murder.'
D. Gregg v. Georgia: Death Penalty Is Not Always Cruel and
Unusual
In 1976, a Georgia court convicted Troy Gregg of armed
robbery and murder and sentenced him to die for both
crimes." Upon review of Gregg's case, the United States
Supreme Court held that "the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the constitution.7 3 It is not an inherently

barbaric or unacceptable mode of punishment for a crime, '
but before a convicted defendant can be sentenced to die the
judge or jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of ten
aggravating circumstances specified in the Georgia statute. 75
70. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162 (1976).
71. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
72. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
73. Id. at 169.
74. Coker, 433 U.S. at 591.
75. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1976). The following is the list of the
aggravating circumstances to be considered which may allow the judge or jury
to impose the death penalty:
1. The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a
substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
2. The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder
was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
burglary or arson in the first degree.
3. The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery or kidnapping
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a
public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
4. The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of
monetary value.
5. The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district
attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or
because of the exercise of his official duty.
6. The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
7. The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated batter to the victim.
8. The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
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The evidence in this case established that Gregg
murdered his two victims so that he could rob them and take
their car.7 ' The trial judge instructed the jury that it would
not be authorized to consider imposing the death penalty
unless it first found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the
aggravating circumstances."
The jury found that: "the
offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of two other capital
felonies,... [and t]hat the offender committed the offense of
murder for the purpose of receiving money and the
automobile described in the indictment." 8 These qualified as
two of the aggravating circumstances in Georgia's statute and
Gregg's death sentence for the crime of murder was upheld. 9
The aggravating circumstances assured the Supreme Court
that the death penalty would be handed down fairly" and
Georgia's death penalty law remained temporarily in-tact.
But in the same opinion, the Court devoted much time to
its concern that the punishment must fit the crime.' As early
as the Magna Carta there was concern that "[a] free man
shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance
with the degree of the offense."8 2 In 1910, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Philippine punishment "Cadra temporal," which was imposed
for falsifying a document."
That punishment included "at
least twelve years and one day, in chains, at hard and painful
labor... and subjection to lifetime surveillance."8 4 The Court
rejected "the proposition that the Eighth Amendment reaches
corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of
his official duties.
9. The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement.
10. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
76. Id. at 159.
77. Id. at 161.
78. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 161 (1976).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 171.
82. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972).
83. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
84. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
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only punishments that are 'inhumane' and focused rather on
the proportion between the crime and the punishment.8 5 In
Weems v. United States,86 the Court concluded that "such
penalties for such offenses amaze those who... believe that it
is a precept of justice that punishment for a crime should be
graduated and proportionate to the offense."87
In 1958, while reviewing the constitutionality of
denationalization used to punish a soldier who had been a
deserter for a day, the United States Supreme Court
"observed in dicta that 'fines, imprisonment and even
execution may be imposed depending on the enormity of the
crime."'88 Further, in 1976, the Gregg Court noted that in
order for a punishment to meet the "basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment" it must not be "excessive."89 That is,
"the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime."9" So while holding that the death
penalty was not always unconstitutional, the United States
Supreme Court found that it must be appropriate for the
crime. 1
E. Coker v. Georgia: Death Penalty Is Cruel and Unusual
Punishmentfor the Crime of Rape
Just one year later, the United States Supreme Court
heard another Georgia case imposing the death penalty, but
this time it was being applied for the crime of rape." Erhlich
Coker, the defendant, escaped from Ware Correctional
Institution, broke into the Carvers' home, robbed them, and
raped Mrs. Carver. 3 The Georgia law Coker was sentenced
under provided that a person convicted of rape shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for not less than one
and not more than twenty years.94 When determining the
appropriate sentence, the jury was instructed that it could

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
Id. at 172 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
Id. at 173.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
Id.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 586
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consider "aggravating circumstances,"9 5 such as whether the
rape was committed by someone with a prior conviction of a
felony or whether it was committed while committing another
capital felony.96 The jury found both of these aggravating
circumstances present and sentenced Coker to death by
electrocution.9 7 Though Coker had previously committed
other felonies, this conviction was only for the crime of rape.9"
At the time the United States Supreme Court heard this
case, Georgia was the only state that allowed the death
penalty to be imposed for the rape of an "adult woman."99
Upon review of Coker, the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
prevents states from executing defendants convicted of raping
adult women.010 The court recognized after reviewing a long
series of cases, "it was now settled that the death penalty is
not invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment,"'0 ' but the Court went on
to reason that a punishment is unconstitutional if it is too
severe for the crime committed.'
After reviewing the decline
in the number of states permitting a death sentence for the
crime of rape, from sixteen down to only three,' 3 the court
concluded that the sentence of death was a "grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
rape" and was, therefore, forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual.'
The Justices claimed
that the legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape in
other states strongly confirmed their own judgment that it
was a disproportionate penalty for the rape of an adult
95. Id. at 588.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 591.
98. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977). "Coker had prior convictions
for capital felonies rape, murder and kidnapping but these prior convictions do
not change the fact that the instant crime being punished is a rape not
involving the taking of life." Id. Coker was tried separately for the armed
robbery that occurred at the same time as the rape and received a separate life
sentence for that crime. Id.
99. Id. at 596. Florida and Mississippi had laws. allowing for the death
penalty for the rape of a child. Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 943, 950 (Fla.
1981); Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
100. See Higgins, supra note 10.
101. Coker, 433 U.S. at 591.
102. Id. at 592.
103. Id. at 594.
104. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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The Court repeatedly asserted that it was
woman. 05
addressing the issue of rape involving an "adult woman" and
left open the question of how it would rule if the case involved
the rape of a child.'
F. Reaction to Coker v. Georgia
After Coker," ' Tennessee, Florida, and Mississippi
maintained laws allowing for the death penalty to be imposed
on a defendant convicted of raping a child.' 8 The laws of all
three states would eventually be repealed. 09 In 1977, the
same year as Coker, the Supreme Court of Tennessee found
was
penalty
death
mandatory
Tennessee's
that
unconstitutional,"0 leaving only two states with such a severe
penalty for the crime of raping a child.
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Buford v.
Florida"'that the reasoning in Coker compelled them to find
that a sentence of death was grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of sexual assault and,
therefore, forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual even when the victim was a child."' Robert Buford
was convicted of first degree murder and sexual battery of an
eleven-year-old girl."' He received two death sentences for
those crimes."' Though the death sentence was upheld for
the murder conviction, the death penalty imposed for the
sexual assault was vacated."' The Florida Supreme Court
held that under Coker the death penalty was too severe a
punishment even for the rape of a child."6
In 1989, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that "under
105. Id. at 597.
106. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 2425 (1997).
107. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
108. See Higgins, supra note 10.
109. See id.
110. See Collins v. Tennessee, 550 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1977). The
Tennessee Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Woodson and Roberts
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court the previous year. Id.
111. 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981).
112. Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla. 1981). In this case the
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, sexual battery upon a
child under eleven, and burglary with intent to commit sexual battery. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 951.

1278

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

present statutory authority the maximum punishment upon
conviction of [the rape of a child under twelve] is life
imprisonment" 1 7 and did not reach the constitutional
question.1 18 Dale Leatherwood was convicted of raping an
eleven-year-old girl and sentenced to die." 9 Though the
Mississippi law allowed for the death penalty to be imposed
for the conviction of raping a child under twelve, in order for
the sentence to be handed down, it had to be shown that the
defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill or
contemplated lethal force.'
At the time this case was
pending, Mississippi was the only state authorizing death as
12 1
a penalty for rape of any kind.
Invalidating the Mississippi law, the Mississippi Court
reasoned that however heinous or offensive child rape may
be, the victim's life is not taken.'22
Though the victim may hardly forget her nightmarish
experience, sensitive response by family, friends and
competent professionals may often assure recovery so that
in time the victim comes to lead a... quite livable life. In
this sense the harshness of the death penalty is
qualitatively greater than the gravity of the offense. 23
The Mississippi court evaded the constitutionality of the
issue, but in his concurrence, Justice Robertson argued that
because the Mississippi law authorized a death sentence for
the crime of rape, it should be held unconstitutional pursuant
to the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. 4
G. LouisianaRevised Its Law to Allow the Death Penalty to
Be Imposed for the Rape of a Child
In 1995, Louisiana amended its law to allow the death
117. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1068 n.9 (1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997) (citing Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 402 (Miss.
1989)).
118. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1068.
119. Leatherwood, 548 So. 2d 389.
120. Id. at 402.
121. Id. at 404. In 1981, Florida found its law which had allowed for a death
sentence for the rape of a child was unconstitutional under Coker and the
Eighth Amendment. Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla. 1981).
122. Leatherwood, 548 So. 2d at 404.
123. Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989).
124. Id. at 403 (Robertson, J., concurring).
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penalty to be imposed when the victim of rape was under the
age of twelve.'25 Louisiana statute Title 14, § 42 reads in part:
A. Aggravated rape is committed upon a person.., where
the anal or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be
without lawful consent of the victim because it is
committed under any one of the following ...4) the victim
is under the age of [twelve].
C. [I]f the victim was under [twelve] ...[the]126 offender
shall be punished by death or life imprisonment.
In order to convict a defendant under this law it must be
shown that 1) there was anal or vaginal penetration, 2)
without consent, and 3) that the lack of consent was due to
the age of the victim.2 7 Additionally, the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure provides guidelines, which must be
followed, including that the trial be bifurcated, indigent
defendants be given counsel, and12 the conviction be based on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that Louisiana's law
fell within the guidelines of the state's constitution, which
provided that "punishment is excessive and unconstitutional
if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment and hence is nothing more than purposeful
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly
out of proportion to the severity of crime., 129 Technically,
Louisiana's law may also satisfy the requirements of
Furman;"'° but after Coker"' it must be determined whether
the death penalty is really appropriate for the crime of rape
in any situation.
In 1995, two defendants were indicted under Louisiana's
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997); Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So.
2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2425 (1997).
126. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997) (emphasis added).
127. Id. A child under the age of twelve can not legally consent to sexual
intercourse. Id.
128. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1071 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
129. Id. at 1065 (citing LA. CONST art. I § 20; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)).
130. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also discussion supra Part
II.B.
131. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see also discussion supra Part
II.E.
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revised law.'32
In affirming the constitutionality of the
Louisiana law, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that
because children cannot protect themselves the state must
provide protection.'3 3 They went on to say that a "maturing
society" through its legislature has recognized the
degradation and devastation of child rape, and the
permeation of harm resulting to victims of rape in this age
category. 4 The court relied on the fact that the Louisiana
"[Legislature has determined that this crime is deserving of
the death penalty because of its deplorable nature, being a
'grievous affront to humanity."1 35
The contemporary
standards as defined by the Louisiana legislature indicate
that the harm inflicted upon a child when raped is
tremendous, causing the child to suffer physically,
emotionally, and mentally.'
Quoting Gregg v. Georgia,' the Louisiana court reasoned
that "capital punishment is an expression of society's moral
outrage at particularly offensive conduct... [and though]
unappealing to many... it is essential in an ordered
society."'38 The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that
"given the appalling nature of the crime, the severity of the
harm inflicted upon the victim, and the harm imposed on
society, the death penalty is not an excessive penalty for the
crime of rape when the victim is a child under the age of
twelve years old."'39
The Louisiana Supreme Court also found that the
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child would
serve as a deterrent. 4 ' Based on the United States Supreme

132. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063. See also discussion supra Part I.
133. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1067.
134. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997). "While the rape of an adult female in itself reprehensible,
the legislature has concluded that rape becomes much more detestable when
the victim is a child." Id.
135. Id. at 1069.
136. Id. This harm is especially devastating since the majority of offenders
are family members. "The Louisiana courts have held that sex offenses against
children cause untold psychological harm not only to the victim but also to
generations to come." Id. at 1070.
137. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
138. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1070 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183).
139. Id.
140. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
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Court's reasoning in Gregg v. Georgia, the Louisiana court
reasoned that "[tiwo legitimate goals of punishment are
retribution and deterrence."' The Louisiana Supreme Court
found that the "death penalty for the rape of a child less than
twelve years old would be a deterrence to the commission of
that crime."'
Louisiana is no longer the only state authorizing the
death penalty for the rape of a child.'
In 1996, Georgia
revised its penal code to be consistent with Louisiana's.'"
Though the legislature is said to reflect the views of society,
only 4two
states out of fifty have such a severe penalty for
5
rape.

H. The Country's CurrentAttitude About Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Most states require that a life be taken before they will
accept the death penalty as punishment for a crime.
In
1982, the United States Supreme Court held that the death
penalty is impermissible except where the defendant himself
kills, attempts to kill, or intends to kill.' 47 In Enmund v.
Florida,' the defendant had been sentenced to die for his
part as the get away driver in an armed robbery. 149
Defendant's co-conspirator had killed someone during the
commission of the crime, but defendant only sat in the car."'
In holding the death penalty too severe a punishment for this
defendant, the Supreme Court reasoned, "[wie have no doubt
that robbery is a serious crime deserving of serious
punishment. It is not, however, a crime 'so grievous an affront
141. Id.
142. Id. See also discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
143. See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
144. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (1997).
145. See Higgins, supra note 10.
146. Only thirteen states have laws on the books that call for the death
penalty in non-homicide cases, mostly for treason, aggravated kidnapping or
aircraft hijacking. See Higgins, supra note 10, at 31. In addition to first degree
murder, California allows for the death penalty to be imposed for the crime of
treason and for willful perjury, which leads to the execution of an innocent
person. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37, 128 (West 1998).
147. See Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 405 (Miss. 1989) (citing
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794 (1982)).
148. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
149. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782.
150. Id. at 784.
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to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death."""' In fact, the Supreme Court declined to
draw a clear line between crimes that warrant the death
penalty and those that do not, 15 2 but it strongly implied that
the victim should die before death is ordered.'53
The Coker"' Court reasoned that even before it declared
the death penalty unconstitutional for the rape of an adult
woman, "in the vast majority of cases, at least nine out of ten,
juries have not imposed the death sentence [in rape cases]."
Even in Louisiana, juries have sentenced defendants
convicted of raping a child to life imprisonment but not to
death.'56 These life sentences were upheld as constitutional.'5 7
In 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the
mandatory life sentence for aggravated rape of a five-year-old
girl was not disproportionate or unconstitutional.'5 8 In 1994,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana held that a
twenty year sentence for the conviction of "attempted
aggravated rape" of a child under twelve was not
unnecessarily cruel." 9 In 1996, even after Louisiana revised
its law to allow for the death penalty, a Louisiana jury
sentenced a defendant to life imprisonment after he was
convicted of raping his nine and eleven-year-old daughters. 6 °
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the mandatory life
sentence of the defendant in this case was not a violation of
the constitution. 6' In other words, it matched the severity of
the crime.
151. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
152. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1070 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
157 (1987)). The Court discussed the appropriate punishment for intentional
killings and reckless indifference to life, but did not make any clear finding as to
specific crimes where the death penalty would be appropriate and others where
it would not. Id.
153. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
154. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
155. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067, n.6 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 2425 (1997) (citing Coker, 433 U.S. 584).
156. See Louisiana v. Viree 670 So. 2d 733 (La. 1996); Louisiana v. Jamison,
640 So. 2d 438 (La. 1994) (sentencing the defendant to 20 years imprisonment);
Louisiana v. Pokey, 529 So. 2d 474 (La. 1988).
157. See cases cited supra note 156.
158. See Pokey, 529 So.2d at 478.
159. See Louisiana v. Jamison, 640 So. 2d 438, 448 (La. 1994).
160. See Louisiana v. Viree, 670 So. 2d 733 (La. 1996).
161. See id.
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At the time of publication of this comment, Wilson and
Bethley' 62 had not been sentenced-they were merely indicted
by the grand jury and attempted to appeal to the United
States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Louisiana's
law at that time.'6 3 The Supreme Court denied certiorari and
said that if someone was actually sentenced to die under
Louisiana's new law it may entertain the case.'
III. UNRESOLVED ISSUE: IS RAPE OF A CHILD DIFFERENT
THAN RAPE OF AN ADULT?
Twenty years ago the United States Supreme Court held
it was cruel and unusual to punish a convicted rapist by
sentencing him to die.'66 In its holding the Court did not
directly address the crime of raping a child.'66 The Louisiana
Legislature feels that the rape of a child is a much more
heinous crime than the rape of an adult and, therefore, such a
rapist should be punished by death.6 7 But as the United
6 8 absent a
States Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida,'
killing or at least the intention to kill, the death penalty is
cruel and unusual and therefore a violation of the
Constitution.'69
Louisiana's new law does not require that the perpetrator
kill his victim or even that he intend to kill them in order for
.the sentence of death to be imposed.''
The Louisiana
Supreme Court found that sex offenses against children cause
"untold psychological harm not only to the victim but to
generations to come,""' and attempted to distinguish it as
more grievous than the rape of an adult.' 2 Though the

162. See supra Part II.G.
163. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2425 (1997).
164. See Higgins, supra note 10.
165. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The Court was specific in its
reference to the rape of an "adult" woman. Id. at 584.
166. Id. at 592.
167. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 2425 (1997).
168. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
169. Id.
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997). All that is required is that the
there be a rape and that the rape victim be under the age of twelve. Id.
171. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
172. Id. at 1069.
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United States Supreme Court clearly held in Coker v.
Georgia7 3 that the death penalty was a "grossly
disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape, it
remains to be seen how the Court will rule on the
constitutionality of Louisiana's new statute focusing on
children.'7 4
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Death Penalty Is Not an AppropriatePunishmentfor
the Crime of Rape
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
Georgia's law, the only state law at the time that allowed the
death penalty to be imposed for the crime of rape. 75 In its
ruling, the Court reiterated its holding in Gregg v. Georgia
that the death penalty as punishment for deliberate murder
was neither too severe nor disproportionate. 176 It then went
on to reason that the death penalty was grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime 1 of77
rape and "therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."
In coming to this conclusion, the Court looked at history and
the "country's current judgment" with regard to rape and the
death penalty. 78 At the time Cokerwas decided, acceptance of
the death penalty was declining in the United States and at
no time in the preceding fifty years had a majority of the
states authorized death as a punishment for rape."'
The Court also returned to its reasoning in Furman,8 °
that in order for a punishment to be constitutional, it must
first be determined that it did not involve unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain. 8 ' Second, the punishment must not
173. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
174. See discussion supra Part I. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari to Wilson and Bethley at this time because neither defendant had
been convicted. Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
175. See supra Part II.D. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
They concluded that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 592.
176. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
177. Coker, 433 U.S. 584.
178. Id. at 593.
179. Id. at 592-93.
180. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
181. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citing Furman v.
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be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.'82 The
Court did not deny that rape was a horrible crime deserving
serious punishment, but in terms of moral depravity and the
injury to the person and the public, the Justices reasoned
that rape did not compare with murder which involved the
taking of human life."' Though the victim suffered, the crime
in Coker was rape as opposed to murder, so the death penalty
was inappropriate.'
The Supreme Court found that there is
a qualitative difference between murder and rape, and a
lesser degree of harm is produced by rape."'
The Court concluded, "We have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability'.., is an excessive penalty for the rapist who,
as such, does not take human life."'8
Thus although the
Court found that for the crime of murder the death penalty
was acceptable, the Court drew a distinct line in cases where
there was no loss of life, including cases in which the
defendant was convicted of rape." '
The Eighth Amendment is not precise and its "scope is
not static."'88
It draws its meaning from the "evolving
standards of decency that mark our maturing society," 8 ' and
as it has evolved it has come to bar not only those
punishments that are "barbaric but also those that are
excessive."'8 0
The clause forbidding "cruel and unusual
9
punishment" ' is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice.'92 The crimes for which society will condone
the death penalty change with time and after Coker it was
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972)).
182. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Although rape is a reprehensible crime, the
concurrence in Coker found no indication that petitioner's offense was
committed with excessive brutality or that the victim sustained serious or
lasting injury. Id.
183. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
184. Id. at 598.
185. See Higgins, supra note 10, at 31.
186. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
187. See id.
188. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972).
189. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2425 (1997) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
190. Id.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
192. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (quoting Weems v.
United States, 21 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
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considered cruel and unusual to sentence someone to die for
committing rape.9
B. LouisianaNow Wants to Impose the Death Penalty for the
Rape of Child
In 1995, Louisiana revised its legislation to allow for the
sentence of death when a defendant is convicted of raping a
child under twelve.'
Wilson and Bethley were indicted
under Louisiana's revised penal code. 99 Wilson was charged
with the rape of a five-year-old girl; Bethley was charged with
raping three young girls, ages five, seven, and nine.9 These
defendants argued that the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning about the qualitative difference between murder
and rape of an adult woman applies equally to the crime of
raping a child.'97 Neither defendant intended to kill their
victims and all that separated them from Coker was the age
of the victim.9
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Wilson's and
Bethley's argument and found the holding in Coker v.
Georgia.. was limited to the rape of an adult woman. 9° The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to Wilson's
and Bethley's appeal, leaving the holding in Coker as the
precedent of how to treat the death penalty in rape cases.201
The Louisiana court pointed out that the Coker Court took
great pains in referring only to the rape of adult women
throughout the opinion,' °' using the term "adult woman"

193. See supra Part II.E. One of the most important functions of the jury
when deciding between life imprisonment and death for a defendant is to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
194. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997).

195. See supra Part II.G. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
196. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1063.
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
200. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1065.
201. See supra note 191. As previously stated, the United States Supreme

Court found the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment for the
crime of rape. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
202. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117

S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
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fourteen times." 3 Based on this reasoning, the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld Louisiana Code section 14:42,04 which
authorizes the death penalty when a defendant is convicted of
raping a child under twelve. °5
Proponents of Louisiana's law, including Jerry Jones,
who is prosecuting the Bethley case, believe that Coker was
wrongly decided, "probably because appellate judges-like
academics-don't see the crushed lives left behind after rape
and sexual abuse. Who's to say that it's more traumatic to die
than to live with being brutalized? 2 6 The Justices in
Louisiana agreed and reasoned that the rape of a child is an
intentional crime and deserving of death.0 7
But those
supporting Louisiana's law miss the reasoning in Coker and
Enmund, in which the Court held that punishing a crime,
which involved no intent to kill, by executing the defendant is
cruel and unusual.2 8
As devastated as a rape victim may be, "sensitive
response" by family, friends and professionals will assist the
victim back to a "livable life."' 9 A murder takes away human
life and, therefore, imposition of the death penalty may be
justified. 210 But the rapist does not kill and though the crime
is despicable, it is not deserving of the punishment of death.'
C. The Supreme Court Should Find Rape-Even of a ChildIs Still Not Deserving of the Death Penalty
1. The Rape of a Child Does Not Involve Murder
The Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida21 2 that
when there is no intent to kill in a crime, the imposition of
the death penalty constitutes
cruel and unusual
203. Id. at 1065 n.2.
204. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997).

205. Id.
206. See Higgins, supra note 10, at 31.
207. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1072-73. But even the Justices in Coker
acknowledged that rape is never an act committed accidentally and rarely can it
be said to be unpremeditated. Coker, 433 U.S. at 603.
208. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
209. See Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989)
(Robertson, J., concurring).
210. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
211. Id.
212. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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punishment.213 Though Wilson and Bethley may have raped
their victims, they had no intent to kill their victims.214 As
previously discussed, the level of culpability is not as great for
the crime of rape as it is for the crime of murder.21 Though
the rape of a child is more heinous than the rape of an adult,
it is still only rape and absent the intention to kill the victim
the defendant should not be sentenced to die.216
The United States Supreme Court identified three factors
to guide courts in determining whether a sentence meets the
Eighth Amendment's burden: 1) the gravity of the offense and
harshness of the penalty, 2) the sentences imposed on other
criminals for the same offense in the same jurisdiction, and 3)
the sentences imposed on criminals for the same offense in
other jurisdictions. 1 7 Looking at the statutes of other states
is a good way to determine if a penalty is excessive,2 8 and
looking at the other states' statutes in this situation reveals
that Georgia is the only state to agree with Louisiana that
the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for raping a
child. 9 Twenty years after the United States Supreme Court
held the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment for
the rape of an adult woman,2 only two states have revised
213. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). As the dissenting Justices in
Furman noted, the 19th Century movement away from mandatory death
sentences was rooted in the recognition that "individual culpability is not
always measured by the category of the crime committed."
Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1989) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
402 (1972)).
214. Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2425 (1997). Wilson and Bethley have not been convicted, only indicted. Id.
215. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 598. If there is an accompanying capital crime of
murder, it is mostly likely that the defendant would be tried for murder and
receive the death penalty that way so it is not necessary to analyze a case like
that. But when there is no accompanying murder, the death penalty is too
severe a penalty for rape. Id. at 599 n.16.
216. See Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989)
(Robertson, J., concurring).
217. Leatherwood, 548 So. 2d at 406 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292
(1983)).
218. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
219. See Higgins, supra note 10. Though Louisiana was the first state to
pass a law allowing a convicted child rapist to be put to death does not mean the
law does not reflect the views of other states. One year after Louisiana
amended its law Georgia followed passing a statute similar to Louisiana's
making two states in which the rape of a child is a capital crime. See Higgins,
supra note 10.
220. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

1999]

THE DEATH PENALTY

1289

their laws in an attempt to get around the Supreme Court's
ruling."1 The other forty-eight states follow Coker and do not
allow imposition of the death penalty solely for the crime of
rape.
In fact in 1981, the Florida Supreme Court found that the
holding in Coker was controlling for the rape of a child.222
When a defendant convicted of raping an eleven-year-old girl
was sentenced to die, he appealed to Florida's Supreme
Court.223 The court relied first on the reasoning in Gregg,
where the United States Supreme Court found that "[r]ape is
without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms
of moral depravity ... it does not compare with murder....
[RIape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the
rapist, if no more than that, does not." 4 The Florida court
concluded that the reasoning of the Justices in Coker
compelled them to find that "a sentence of death is grossly
disproportionate and excessive" for the crime of rape and,
therefore, forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual.225 Even though the Florida case involved the rape of
an eleven-year-old girl, Coker was found to control.2 6
The only difference in Louisiana's law and the death
penalty statute that the United States Supreme Court found
unconstitutional in Coker is the specification of the age of the
victim.27 No life must be lost before the death penalty can be
imposed under Louisiana's law. 28 As the Supreme Court
specified in Coker and in Enmund, the crime of rape alone is
not enough to allow the perpetrator to be sentenced to die. 9
The Louisiana Court found the class of offenders is
sufficiently limited to those who rape a child under the age of
221. See Higgins, supra note 10. Georgia and Louisiana are the only states
with laws allowing the death penalty to be imposed as punishment for the crime
of rape. Id.
222. Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d at 951.
223. Id. at 943.
224. Id. at 951 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)).
225. Id.
226. Buford, 403 So. 2d at 951.
227. Louisiana's law specifies that the death penalty may only be imposed if
the rape victim was under the age of twelve. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West
1997).
228. See supra note 220.
229. See discussion supra Parts II.E-H. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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twelve and not every rapist will be subject to the death
penalty.3 ° But as previously discussed, the death penalty is
too severe a punishment for the crime of rape regardless of
the victim's age.23'
The Louisiana Supreme Court commented that while
Louisiana was the sole jurisdiction with such a statute in
effect at the time of Wilson's and Bethley's indictments, it had
the suggestion from several other states that their citizens
desire the death penalty for such a heinous crime as well.232
The Louisiana court's belief that other states will follow suit
if this law is upheld maybe misplaced. 33 In fact, in the area
of child rape, there appears to be "no groundswell of support
outside of a few of the southern states. 34
Perhaps the dissent in Wilson said it best, "No other state
in the union imposes the death penalty for the aggravated
rape of a child under twelve. ...

[because]... the statute fails

constitutional scrutiny under the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia... Furman v.
Georgia... and Gregg v. Georgia.... ,,235
The previous
rulings by the Supreme Court have held not only that the
death penalty is cruel and unusual for the crime of rape, but
that it is cruel and unusual for any crime when a life is not
taken.236 But "[flar more convincing than Gregg, or Coker or
Enmund, or any of the others, the American public has
spoken-through its legislatures and juries. That public has
told us that, however heinous it may regard the rape of a
child, death is not an acceptable punishment." 27 It must be

remembered that the question is not "whether we condone
230. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1072 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
231. See discussion supra Parts IV.A.2. See also Leatherwood v. Mississippi,
548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
232. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1069.
233. See discussion supra Part I. The only other state to amend its law to
allow for the death penalty to be imposed for the rape of a child under twelve is
Georgia. See Higgins, supranote 10.
234. See Higgins, supra note 10, at 30.
235. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1074 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
236. See supra Part II.E. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
237. See Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989). Only
two of the fifty states have laws allowing for the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of rape and no one has been executed for committing a rape since
1964. Even since Louisiana revised its law in 1995, no jury has sentenced
someone to die for the crime of rape alone. See Higgins supra note 10, at 30.
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rape or murder, for surely we do not; it is whether capital
punishment [for rape] is a punishment no longer consistent
with our own self-respect."23 8
The United States Supreme Court was in no hurry to
rule on this issue as it denied certiorari to Wilson and Bethley
2 9 But when
on the basis that neither had been convicted.
240
looking at how the Louisiana juries sentence child rapists,
the Court may doubt that a jury will sentence someone to die
for the rape of a child. Even after Louisiana revised its law to
allow for the death penalty, in 1996, a Louisiana jury
sentenced a man convicted of raping his nine and eleven-year24
old daughters to life imprisonment-not to death. '
The Supreme Court has already declared that the
24 2
imposition of the death penalty for rape is unconstitutional.
In fact, it went as far as to say that absent the taking of a life,
242
the death penalty is too severe a punishment for any crime.
The raping of a child is no doubt heinous, but it does not
involve a taking of a life and, therefore, imposition of the
44
'
death penalty would be too severe.
2. The Death Penalty Is Not an Effective Deterrent
The Louisiana Supreme Court also found that the death
245 It held
penalty serves as a deterrent to raping children.
that deterrence and retribution are legitimate goals of
punishment and that the sentence of death for the rape of a
child will be a deterrent.2 46 Even the United States Supreme
Court said that the death penalty serves two social purposes:
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective

238. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 315 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
239. See Higgins, supra note 10. Ira Robins, criminal law professor at
American University's Washington College of Law, comments that it is hard to
predict what the Supreme Court would do with the Louisiana law but hopes
that they strike it down. She fears a slippery slope leading to the death penalty
for less serious crimes like the kidnapping of children. Id.
240. See supra Part II.H. See also Louisiana v. Viree 670 So. 2d 733 (La.
1996); Louisiana v. Jamison, 640 So. 2d 438 (La. 1994); Louisiana v. Pokey, 529
So. 2d 474 (La. 1988).
241. See Louisiana v. Viree 670 So. 2d 733 (La. 1996).
242. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
243. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
244. See Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989).
245. See Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
246. See id.
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offenders.247
But statistical attempts to evaluate the deterrence value
of the death penalty have been inconclusive.24 There is no
evidence that the threat of death as punishment for a crime
will deter those who seek to rape children. 249 Furthermore,
because of the manner in which the penalty is implemented
in the United States, a rational person contemplating raping
a child is confronted not with a certain death, but with a
slight possibility that he may be executed at some point in the
distant future.2" This is really no deterrent at all.
V. PROPOSAL

Louisiana Penal Code section 14:42, and Georgia Penal
Code section 16:61 should be repealed as they are
unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court's
current rulings.25 ' Neither law requires that a life be taken
before the death penalty may be imposed.2 2 In Coker v.
Georgia,25 ' the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape
is unconstitutional. 254

The Court conceded that rape was a

despicable crime and deserved serious punishment,255 but
found a qualitative difference between the rape and murder.256
The Court concluded that the death penalty, "which is unique
in its severity and irrevocability... is an excessive penalty
for the rapist, who as such, does not take a human life."257
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court went as far as
to say that absent the killing of another person, or at least
the intent to kill another person, the death penalty is too

247. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
248. See id. at 184-85.
249. See id.
250. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
251. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238 (1972).
252. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997); GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-1
(1997).

253. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
254.
255.
256.
257.

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
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severe a punishment for any crime.58 The raping of a child is
no doubt a heinous crime, but it is not murder and, therefore,
the imposition of the death penalty is cruel and unusual.2 59
When someone is sentenced to die for raping a child
under either Georgia's or Louisiana's laws, the United States
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order to declare
once and for all that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment for the crime of rape no matter what the age of
the victim. 6 ' Relying on precedent,26 1 the Justices should find
that despite the despicable nature of the crime of rape, even
of a child, it does not qualify as a crime deserving of the
punishment of death.2 2
Pallie Zambrano

258. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
259. See Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So. 2d 389, 405 (Miss. 1989).
260. The United States Supreme Court has already held that the death
penalty is too severe a punishment for the crime of rape. Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977).
261. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
262. The Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida that absent a killing or
at least the intention to kill, the death penalty is a cruel and unusual
punishment. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

